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The Dynamics 
of investments 
in young 
children
by Philip a. trostel
DynaMicS oF inveSTMenTS in yoUnG cHilDRen
Philip Trostel presents compelling evidence of the 
importance of early investment in young children, 
citing research demonstrating the economic and social 
benefits of such investments. He suggests that the lack 
of understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship 
between early childhood experiences and later-life 
consequences and a failure to conceptualize how 
things might be done in new ways are both obstacles. 
Trostel argues that investing in early childhood devel-
opment benefits children for the rest of their lives, 
benefits government with reduced spending in other 
areas, and moreover is the “right thing to do.”    
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inTRoDUcTion 
in the mid 1960s, 1 three- and four-year-old african-american children living in poverty were 
selected for a pioneering study on the long-term effects 
of high-quality preschooling. almost half of those  
children (58 of the 1) were randomly chosen to 
participate in the High/Scope Perry Preschool program 
in ypsilanti, Michigan. The other half served as a 
control group. Most (three-fourths) of those randomly 
selected into the program attended the Perry Preschool 
for two academic years, with the rest only attending 
one year at age four. This preschool program consisted 
of weekday .5-hour sessions taught in small groups 
(there was an average of fewer than six children per 
teacher) by a certified teacher with at least a bachelor’s 
degree, and 1.5-hour weekly home visits and curric-
ulum interaction with mothers. The annual cost per 
child was about $11,00 in 007 dollars. For further 
information on the program and its consequences, see 
Schweinhart et al. (005).
of the 1 children originally in the study, data 
from all 116 still alive were collected when they 
reached age 40 several years ago. The results are 
nothing short of remarkable. of the Perry Preschool 
attendees (the treatment group), 65 percent had gradu-
ated from regular high school, compared to only 45 
percent of those in the control group. only 6 percent 
of the control group was employed at age 40, compared 
to 76 percent of the treatment group. Median annual 
earnings at age 40 were about 6 percent higher for the 
group participating in the enriched preschool program. 
Moreover, 17 percent of the group not participating in 
the program was incarcerated at age 40, compared to 
six percent of those with the good fortune of being 
selected into the high-quality preschool program. even 
survival to age 40 was evidently positively affected by 
preschool participation (97 percent for the treatment 
group compared to 9 percent for the control group). 
Similarly, fewer of the treatment group had received 
some form of social services by age 40, and fewer had 
used illegal drugs and legal medications. even after 
taking the “time value of money” into account (i.e., 
discounting the benefits that occur after the up-front 
cost), the value of some of the various benefits to the 
participants and to society from participation in the 
Perry Preschool program was 
estimated to be more than nine 
times greater than the cost of the 
program.
Rather than emphasize  
the astounding payoff from the 
Perry Preschool experiment, one 
could just as easily emphasize 
the tragic unfairness for those 
with the random misfortune  
of being in the control group. 
The children excluded from  
the opportunity of a quality 
preschool experience generally 
suffered the consequences for 
the rest of their lives. and, as if that were not bad 
enough, the rest of society experienced the higher costs 
of crime, incarceration, and welfare spending, and 
lower tax revenues. Denying people opportunities to 
create successful lives in the name of research is an 
inexplicable injustice.
if only this inexplicable injustice were an isolated 
incident. The real tragedy is that denying children 
opportunities for success occurs on a much wider scale 
right now here in Maine. of course, the exclusion is not 
in the name of research. it occurs because early child-
hood educational opportunities are perceived as being 
too costly—especially now in these tight budgetary 
times. what is truly costly, however, is status quo. we 
simply cannot afford not to make much greater invest-
ments in laying the groundwork for successful lives for 
our young children.
THe PayoFF:  
a BRieF SURvey oF THe ReSeaRcH
although the Perry Preschool study is the most widely celebrated research on the benefits of early 
childhood programs, it is not alone in demonstrating 
astounding returns to early childhood programs. For 
more in-depth reviews of the research briefly summa-
rized below, see currie (001), Karoly Kilburn and 
cannon (005), cunha et al. (006), and Blau and 
currie (006).
The abecedarian study is the other well-known 
small-scale randomized trial involving young children 
We simply cannot 
afford not to make 
much greater invest-
ments in laying the 
groundwork for 
successful lives for 
our young children.
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and the collection of long-term longitudinal data. This 
program provided full-day, year-round child care with 
educational emphasis for 5 of 104 at-risk children 
born in chapel Hill, north carolina, in the mid-1970s 
(the remaining 51 served as a control group). High-
quality child care was provided for the treatment group 
from infancy until kindergarten at age five. The cumu-
lative five-year cost was approximately $77,000 per 
child in 007 dollars (for further information on the 
cost and benefits of this program, see Barnett and 
Masse 007). Followed through to age 1, the treated 
group had significantly lower costs in K-1 education 
(from less participation in special education and less 
grade repetition), less smoking and illegal drug use, 
higher rates of high school completion and college 
attendance, and greater earnings potential. after 
discounting the benefits occurring after participation  
in the program, the value of some of the benefits was  
estimated to be .5 times greater than the cost. The 
benefit-cost ratio for the abecedarian program is much 
less than for the Perry Preschool program, primarily 
because it did not measure any benefits from reduced 
crime, which accounted for the majority of the 
measured benefits from the earlier experiment.
The chicago child-Parent center program begun 
in 1967 is a high-quality half-day preschool program 
for at-risk three- and four-year-olds. The annual cost 
was about $7,500 per preschooler in 007 dollars. 
instead of a small-scale randomized trial, it is a large-
scale project that has been evaluated by comparing the 
outcomes of the participants to the outcomes of chil-
dren with comparable socioeconomic backgrounds. 
after discounting the post-preschool consequences,  
the estimated value of the increase in earnings and the 
decreases in the costs of crime, K-1 education, and 
social insurance was almost eight times greater than  
the cost of the program.
The benefits of early childhood interventions were 
also shown in the Prenatal/early infancy project, a 
small-scale randomized trial of home visitation for low-
income, first-time, young and unmarried mothers in 
elmira, new york. in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
numerous and lengthy pre- and postnatal visits were 
made by specially trained nurses in a mostly white, 
rural area. The benefits have been estimated to be four 
times the cost. However, the discounted benefit-cost 
ratios of other home-visitation programs are generally 
somewhat smaller than this, although they are still 
greater than one.
Because of their scientific designs, the results of 
these programs represent the most highly regarded 
evidence on the effects of early childhood interventions. 
ironically, the academic jury is still out on Head Start, by 
far the nation’s largest and best-known program for early 
childhood education. This federally funded and locally 
administered program currently serves almost a million 
children (mostly four-year-olds) per year at an annual 
cost of about $7 billion. Because of the lack of a control 
group and the difficulties in constructing a comparison 
group that is truly comparable, the evidence on the effec-
tiveness of Head Start is mixed.
overall, the literature generally indicates tremen-
dous returns from targeted efforts to lay early ground-
work for socially and economically successful lives. 
although more research on the topic narrowing the 
precision of the estimates of the returns of early child-
hood interventions would be useful, it is quite clear 
that the returns can be substantial. Moreover, much  
of the return accrues to the general public (i.e., greater 
tax revenues and lower costs of crime, incarceration, 
public health, and welfare). indeed, given the estimated 
returns, if targeted investments in early childhood 
development were private investment opportunities 
capitalists would have scooped up those windfall-profit 
opportunities long ago.
$100 BillS lyinG on THe GRoUnD
investments in early childhood education are analo-gous to proverbial $100 bills lying on the ground 
waiting to be picked up. To illustrate the principle that 
investors seize clearly profitable private investment 
opportunities, economists often joke that we do not 
like all other investments, the costs of 
early childhood programs are borne up 
front, and the benefits accrue later.
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see $100 bills just lying around because people would 
obviously quickly scoop them up. For public invest-
ment opportunities, however, this principle often fails, 
and public investment in our most precious asset is a 
glaring example.
what makes this figurative $100-bills-left-on-the-
ground instance particularly tragic is that not only is 
investment in early childhood development the finan-
cially sensible thing to do, it is also the moral impera-
tive. no reasonable argument can be made against 
improving and equalizing opportunities for successful 
lives, all else the same. in most instances there is a 
severe tradeoff between equity and economic efficiency. 
That is, attempting to equalize incomes through 
various social-insurance and public-welfare programs  
is typically extremely costly in terms of aggregate  
prosperity. arthur okun famously described this harsh  
tradeoff as a “leaky bucket” (okun 1975). a lot of 
income is spilled in passing income from the rich to  
the poor. in the case of early childhood interventions, 
though, the bucket is not only watertight, it actually 
fills as greater opportunities are created for disadvan-
taged young children. Unlike perhaps any other egali-
tarian policy, there is no tradeoff between strict fiscal 
stewardship and promoting greater equality.
The leading proponent of the idea above is James 
Heckman, a nobel laureate in economics. He recently 
summarized the argument (Heckman 008):
 a large body of research establishes that 
investing in disadvantaged young children 
improves the productivity of the economy and, 
at the same time, reduces social and economic 
inequality. in the world of politics where 
“tradeoffs” are the rule, a policy of investing 
in disadvantaged young children is rare. For 
this policy, there is no tradeoff between equity 
and efficiency, between fairness and economic 
productivity. Sixty years ago, Harry Truman 
said he would like to have a one-handed econ-
omist. asked why, he said that every econo-
mist he met gave him a menu of choices and 
not a preferred choice. They would tell him, 
“on the one hand, if you adopt this policy 
you will get these benefits and costs; on the 
other hand, if you adopt another policy then 
there are these benefits and costs.” if there 
were only one hand, the choice would be clear. 
investing in disadvantaged young children is 
one policy where the choice is clear and the 
two hands clap together…. The good news for 
policymakers is that there is strong evidence 
that early environments can be enriched and 
that we can offset, in part, the powerful conse-
quences of the accident of birth.
it is thus particularly ironic that the typical argu-
ment against devoting more resources to early child-
hood development is its cost, particularly now in such 
harsh budgetary times. But budgets are always tight.  
if we cannot afford it now, then when? not now often 
means never. Moreover, if the debate comes down to 
just cost, then not making these investments is what is 
really costly. The failure to pick up the figurative $100 
bills means greater costs in K-1 education, crime and 
crime prevention, incarceration, and welfare spending, 
as well as reduced opportunities for the success of our 
young people.
FailURe To concePTUaliZe
like all other investments, the costs of early child- hood programs are borne up front, and the benefits 
accrue later. it is this initial cost that appears to be the 
obstacle to ensuring quality early starts for the children 
of Maine. in my opinion, though, the initial cost is not 
really the primary obstacle to picking up the figurative 
$100 bills lying around. no matter how tight budgets  
get, we manage to fund other investments, such as K-1  
and higher education, and road maintenance, to name a 
few. i believe the problem is that we have a difficult time 
imagining the counterfactual, that is, what would occur  
if we did things differently, or how things are different 
now as a consequence of our previous decisions.
if we do not maintain our roads, we can still use 
them for a long time, but we get visible reminders—big 
potholes—that something needs to be done. The lack  
of investment in early childhood education also creates 
big potholes—more spending on special and remedial 
education, greater spending on police and corrections, 
more drug and crime problems, smaller tax base—but 
we are unaware that an important cause of these prob-
lems is our insufficient investment in our youngest 
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children. To paraphrase a famous line from the movie 
Cool Hand Luke (read this with a theatrical drawl), 
what we have here is a failure to conceptualize. it is  
this failure to conceptualize future counterfactual cost 
savings that leads us to believe that the budget is too 
tight right now, and investment in our young children 
is not an urgent priority.
a fairly well known academic economist, lee 
Hansen at the University of wisconsin, joked to his 
graduate students that “if you can’t measure it, it might 
as well not exist.” Unfortunately, there is too large a 
grain of truth in this. we do not readily see the benefits 
of early childhood education, so in policy discussions 
they might as well not exist. consequently, too much 
of our spending goes to costly band-aids—remedial and 
special education, corrections, and welfare—rather than 
to relatively inexpensive prevention. Given the magni-
tudes of the costs of these band-aid programs (see Table 
1 for examples) prevention only needs to have small 
effects to lead to big savings.
 
 
TABLE 1:  selected Maine state and  
 local Government spending  
 in FY 2005–06
total Per Capita
Public Welfare $2,496,584,000 $1,903
special education $282,763,474 $215
Police Protection $221,288,000 $169
Corrections $182,639,000 $139
 
source: special education expenditure is from the Maine 
department of education. all other data are from the u.s. 
Census bureau.
The net benefits of early education are not readily 
seen for two reasons. First, the hazards of inadequate 
development in early childhood are latent, that is, not 
observed until much later. if the same hazards (proba-
bilities of incarceration, drug abuse) were immediate, 
such as providing alcohol to minors, they almost 
certainly would be illegal. Second, there is no explicit 
exchange of dollars when the latent effects occur. 
Thus, the subsequent costs savings in K-1 education 
and incarceration, for example, would not show up  
in an accounting line labeled “returns to investment  
in early education.” But this does not make the 
returns any more hypothetical or any less real than  
if actual dollars were exchanged every time a child  
is prevented from repeating a grade or spending time 
in detention. of course, more research quantifying 
these difficult-to-measure benefits would help us to 
better visualize the counterfactual consequences, but 
the primary obstacle is the preoccupation with explicit 
monetary transactions. it is the preoccupation with 
what is easily measurable that has led to all sorts of 
economically inefficient policies, such as allowing  
too much environmental degradation. we must hope 
that this improves over time with improved ability  
to estimate values of things that do not involve market 
transactions.
also contributing to doubts about the payoff from 
early childhood interventions is the rather large range 
of estimated benefit-cost ratios. The ratios in the case 
studies noted above ranged from greater than nine to 
less than three. This suggests uncertainty about the 
value of the benefits of early education programs. 
actually, the benefit-cost ratios vary not because of 
uncertainly about the values of the benefits, but rather 
because of which benefits can be measured in each case. 
For example, some studies do not measure the value of 
the reduction in crime, other studies do not include the 
value of better health, some do not include the benefits 
that accrue over entire lifetimes, and so on. The lower 
range of cost-benefit ratios are mostly due to including 
the value of fewer benefits in the calculations. Hence, 
the most complete estimates are generally in the upper 
range of cost-benefit numbers.
wHy THe PayoFF iS So HiGH
Perhaps another obstacle to making significantly greater investment in early childhood develop-
ment is that the purported return is almost too high 
to believe. it is like the joke about the two econo-
mists who walk past a $100 bill lying on the ground. 
neither will pick it up because a real $100 bill lying 
on the ground is just too good to be true. in the case 
of investment in the human capital of preschool chil-
dren, though, there is a straightforward reason for 
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the extraordinarily high returns. it has to do with the 
nature of human capital accumulation.
The more skills one learns, the easier it becomes  
to learn additional skills. as nobel Prize laureate James 
Heckman (000: 4) has written, “early learning begets 
later learning and early success breeds later success.”  
Human capital accumulation has a self-productive 
aspect. in other words, the production of human capital 
is characterized by dynamic complementarity: the impact 
of investment in human capital at a particular time in 
the life cycle affects, and is affected by, investments in 
human capital at other times in the life cycle. This is 
analogous to the “miracle of compound interest” with 
financial investments, but is considerably stronger in the 
case of human capital accumulation, which is why 
investing early and often is so important and why the 
payoff can be so high. it is also why later investments in 
children’s human capital are also important. For far too 
many disadvantaged young children, our expensive 
investments in their educations are largely ineffective 
because of insufficient development in early childhood. 
conversely, greater investments in early childhood invest-
ments would be largely ineffective if they come from 
substantial cuts in investments in primary, secondary, 
and tertiary education (although greater early childhood 
investments will lead to later reductions in the costs of 
remedial education).
indeed, the first several years of education, and 
presumably preschool, have little direct economic 
payoff (for evidence on this, see Trostel 004; 
Heckman, lochner and Todd 008). as common sense 
would suggest, the payoff from the first years of 
schooling is in preparing the student for later years  
of schooling, and those years have a direct economic 
return (for further discussion on this point, see cunha 
et al. 006; cunha and Heckman 007). also, for 
those falling behind initially it is difficult, even impos-
sible, to catch up. adverse early childhood experiences 
can create a permanent barrier to success in life.
The empirical evidence on the nature of human 
capital accumulation suggests that achieving economic 
success through education is analogous to climbing a 
hill. imagine biking and being at the bottom of a big 
hill. The crucial part of the effort up the hill is where  
it starts to get steep. The key to getting through this 
tough part where the road turns upward is having and 
keeping momentum from the start. if you start from a 
standing stop on the steepest part, you are unlikely to 
make it up the hill. Thus, it is the beginning that 
generates the momentum for the hardest part that is 
crucial. Having enough early momentum to get 
through the inflection point (where the slope starts to 
diminish) makes the rest of the hill relatively easy. 
Reaching academic, social, and economic summits is 
like this biking example. The production profile of 
human capital is shaped like a hill.
There is also empirical evidence on the other side of 
the dynamic-complementarity issue. That is, the returns 
to early investments in human capital depend  
on the extent of later investments. The high returns to 
early interventions are contingent on continued invest-
ment. To go back to the biking-up-a-hill analogy, although 
effort before the steepest part of the hill may be the most 
crucial, continued effort all the way up is needed to reach 
the summit. even past the inflection point where the slope 
starts becoming less steep, coasting and losing momentum 
can still lead to failure. For example, some research has 
found that the initial gains in academic achievement tests 
from participation in Head Start “faded out” in elemen-
tary school because the former Head Start participants 
generally attended poorer schools (see currie and Thomas 
000). Thus, early and sustained investment creates the 
compounding effect.
caveaTS
Two important points should be stressed about esti-mates of the returns to investment in early child-
hood development.
For far too many disadvantaged young  
children, our expensive investments in  
their educations are largely ineffective 
because of insufficient development  
in early childhood. 
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First, because of the dynamic complementarity, the 
return to early childhood investments is contingent on 
later human capital investments. consequently, the rate 
of return at various stages of investment in human 
capital is not well defined. The rate of return to invest-
ment at a specific stage of human capital accumulation 
depends on one’s perspective, that is, on the particular 
thought experiment being considered. The return esti-
mated from a preschool intervention, for example, 
implicitly holds all else constant, including the quantity 
and quality of later schooling. Similarly, the estimated 
return for high school or college graduation, for 
instance, implicitly holds the quantity and quality of 
preschool and primary education constant. But these 
stages of education are unlikely to be independent of 
each other. So, there is no clear cut way to unambigu-
ously isolate the benefits of a specific stage of educa-
tional development. in other words, research studies 
examining different stages of preschool or school could 
attribute the same benefits (higher earnings and tax 
revenues, lower costs of incarceration and welfare) to 
different levels of human capital development.
This has important policy implications, but this 
point has been overlooked in the mushrooming litera-
ture on the returns to early childhood programs (as 
well as in the literature on the returns to high school 
and college graduation). The failure to account for the 
dynamic complementarity between human capital 
investments can misguide policy. The estimated returns 
from a specific preschool intervention, which implicitly 
hold all else constant, do not generalize for a realloca-
tion of preschool and school funding. The apparent 
“fade out” of the benefits of Head Start serves as a good 
lesson in this regard. it is important to keep in mind 
the specific experiment from which the estimated 
returns were derived.
The second, more well-known, caveat about esti-
mated benefits of investment in early childhood devel-
opment is that almost all the estimates are from 
targeted interventions. That is, the estimates are for 
children the most at risk for low educational, social, 
and economic outcomes. The benefit-cost ratios for 
such targeted interventions are surely higher than for 
early childhood programs for the broader population. 
a far higher proportion of non-at-risk children are  
on their way to successful lives without new programs.  
it is unclear, however, to what extent the benefit-cost 
ratio would be lower for a wide-reaching early child-
hood program. Karoly and Bigelow (005), however, 
calculated that the returns to a universal preschool 
program would not be dramatically less than the 
returns to targeted programs. The benefit-cost ratio  
in their baseline case, after discounting the future bene-
fits, was .6. Thus, as programs for early childhood 
development reach a wider population, evidently the 
larger the net benefits for society. The policy goal 
should not be to achieve the higher benefit-cost ratio, 
but rather to undertake all policies with benefit-cost 
ratios greater than one.
conclUSion
The evidence is steadily mounting that investing  in early childhood development pays in a big way. 
it benefits the children for the rest of their lives. it 
also benefits society with reduced crime and reduced 
government spending in other areas. Moreover, it 
benefits society in terms of being the right thing to do 
(which clearly has value too). it is rare that a public 
policy choice does not present difficult tradeoffs, but 
greater investment in young children is such a case.
as i see it, the real obstacle preventing us from 
taking advantage of the windfall-profit opportunities of 
investing in our young children is the lack of aware-
ness. The cause-and-effect relationships between early 
childhood learning and later-life consequences are 
underappreciated, and our spending priorities lean too 
far toward treating the symptoms rather than on low-
cost prevention. in a 009 press release from the 
Highscope educational Research Foundation, Sanford 
newman, founder of Fight crime: invest in Kids, put a 
it is rare that a public policy choice does  
not present difficult tradeoffs, but greater 
investment in young children is such a case.
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particularly eloquent point on this: “…we need to be 
as willing to guarantee our kids space in a pre-kinder-
garten program as we are to guarantee a criminal a 
prison cell” (www.highscope.org/content.
asp?contentid=8).  indeed, we should be more 
willing to guarantee our kids quality early childhood 
education than later-life band-aids.
whenever i think about the issue of early child-
hood investments, i recall the old long-running ad 
campaign of a well-known muffler business—where the 
mechanic chuckles at the end “well, you can pay me 
now, or you can pay me (a lot more) later.” Basic main-
tenance on a car is an obvious way to prevent expensive 
problems later. if only we could see early childhood 
development as an obvious way to prevent expensive, 
and inequitable, problems later. 
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